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Performance Data Collection as a Means to
Measure Providers' Quality of Care
Introduction by Karen L. Henley, R.N., B.S.N.*

I. INTRODUCTION

Performance matters in a healthcare economy. Data collection and its
analysis provide effective ways to help end the taboo of medical mistakes
while promoting enhanced quality care outcomes. Dr. Paul M. Schyve,
M.D., Senior Vice President of the Joint Commission (formerly Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations), spoke about
performance measurement in improvement and accreditation, primarily as it
relates to hospitals, while addressing the Sixth Annual Health Law and
Policy Colloquium at Loyola University Chicago School of Law. He
provided an insider's viewpoint from a private accreditation body,
illustrating the role of data collection and its surrounding issues.
Dr. Schyve is responsible for working with professional, patient,
consumer, and government organizations to enhance the quality of care
provided to the public. He has worked for the Joint Commission since 1986
and has dedicated most of his professional life to enhancing the quality of
health care in this country. Dr. Schyve is certified in psychiatry by the
American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology and is a Distinguished Life
Fellow of the American Psychiatric Association. He is a member of the
Board of Directors of the National Alliance for Health Information
Technology and a Founding Advisor of Consumers Advancing Patient
Safety. In addition, Dr. Schyve has served on multiple advisory panels for
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality, and the Institute of Medicine. Dr. Schyve is well
published in the areas of psychiatric treatment and research,
psychopharmacology, quality assurance, continuous quality improvement,
healthcare accreditation, patient safety, and healthcare ethics.
The Joint Commission is a private accreditation body that is granted
authority by federal and state governments to accredit hospitals.1 It
accredits more than 15,000 healthcare facilities in the United States. 2 The
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Joint Commission inspects hospitals every two to three years to ascertain3
their compliance with structural and process-oriented quality measures.
Further, the Joint Commission's Office of Quality Monitoring receives,
assesses, and monitors complaints affecting healthcare quality.4 While
hospitals are not required to follow the non-profit organization's
guidelines, 5 most hospitals seek compliance with Joint Commission
standards because Joint Commission accreditation is necessary
to qualify
6
requirements.
licensure
some
and
payments
Medicare
for
The Joint Commission's quality improvement surveillance system
continues to evolve. In 1996, the Joint Commission's Sentinel Event Policy
required health organizations to conduct root cause analysis for all serious
adverse events, while additionally requiring the organizations to establish
measures to decrease the likelihood that such events would occur again.7
The Sentinel Event Policy encourages the self-reporting of "an unexpected
occurrence involving
death or severe physical or psychological injury, or
8
thereof.",
risk
the
In 2002, the Joint Commission established six National Patient Safety
Goals. 9 The goals include improved accuracy of patient identification,
enhanced medication safety, reduced risk of healthcare-associated
infections, reduced risk of patient falls, prevention of pressure ulcers, and
identification of safety risks inherent in the organization's patient
population. 10 If an organization fails to implement the recommendations
associated with these goals, it can affect the organization's accreditation
status. 1
Some express doubts that the Joint Commission has enhanced hospital
quality and argue that the Joint Commission's undersized sentinel event
Have Reporting Systems Made a Measurable Difference?, 15 HEALTH MATRIx 329, 359

(2005).
3. Michelle M. Mello et al., Fostering Rational Regulation of Patient Safety, 30 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 375, 381-82 (2005).
4. Id. at 382.
5. Katharine Van Tassel, Hospital Peer Review Standards and Due Process: Moving
From Tort Doctrine Toward ContractPrinciplesBased on ClinicalPractice Guidelines, 36
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database points to significant underreporting.1 2 However, the Joint
Commission continues to play a key role in this country's movement for
increased healthcare quality. Notably, the Joint Commission's data
collection in performance measurement continues to challenge healthcare
facilities to provide the most optimal care possible.
This introduction will briefly address the benefits of provider
performance transparency, including discovery of medical errors,
empowerment of individuals as consumers, promotion of providers' internal
learning, ability of government to focus regulation, and payors' use in payfor-performance. It will also discuss the conflict in tort law, which seeks
punishment of providers as a means to effect quality care, versus the
movement for sanction-free environments to promote better performance.
1I. THE NEED FOR DATA COLLECTION TO MEASURE PERFORMANCE

Electronic data gathering is arguably one of the most important ways to
improve quality of care. It can be used to evaluate processes and
outcomes.' 3 Without electronic surveillance systems, the compilation and4
interpretation of large amounts of data would be realistically impossible.
When used appropriately, data collection of provider performance will
increase the quality of health care achieved and still allow for patient and
physician privacy.1 5 Indeed, some argue that as both positive and negative
to using
patient outcomes are collected, our society may be less attracted
6
performance.'
provider
of
discovery
force
to
system
legal
the
A. CollectingData Discovers Medical Errors
The collection of electronic data for the use of improving the quality of
our nation's healthcare system allows for the discovery of unknown errors,
risks, and trends.' 7 It thereby allocates to providers focal areas of quality
improvement needs. The Institute of Medicine's 1999 report, To Err Is
Human, attributed between 44,000 and 98,000 deaths to avoidable medical
errors in hospitals. 18 The importance of analyzing hospital performance
12.
13.
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Gerald M. Eisenberg, The Medical Staff Structure-Its role in the 21s1 Century, 12

ANNALS HEALTH L. 249, 250 (2003).
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Between Privacy, Secrets and Hidden Defects, 51 VILL. L. REv. 803, 804 (2006).
16. Id.
17. Harrington, supra note 2, at 330.
18.
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data is even more significant considering that medical errors, if ranked as a
disease, would be the sixth leading cause of death in this country-ahead of
pneumonia and diabetes. 19
Importantly, medical errors could be significantly decreased when these
incidences are realized and when unsafe, unknown trends are discovered by
the collection of performance data. 20 The collection of information into
databases can find hidden patterns, which may previously have remained
dormant in a case-by-case analysis. 21 Specifically, large-scale data analysis
can solve a variety of needs: (1) predicting-learning a pattern from
examples and using the model to predict future values of the target variable;
(2) classification-finding a function that groups records into discrete
classes; (3) detection of relations-searching for the independent variables
for a selected target of variables; (4) explicit modeling-finding explicit
formulae describing dependencies between various variables; (5)
clustering-identifying groups of records that are similar between
themselves but different from the rest of the data; and (6) deviation
detection--determining the most significant changes in some key measures
of data from previous or expected values.22
Thus, adverse patient outcomes, as well as poor provider performances,
may be realized by the collection of data on performance measures. 23
Significantly, the Joint Commission's and government agencies' increased
focus on quality improvement measures forces providers to acknowledge,
resolve, and prevent adverse outcomes and risk factors, thereby enhancing
quality improvement.24
B. Patientsare Empowered as Consumers
The competition theory foresees individuals as buyers and sellers in
health care where selection of providers is based on performance results.25
Moreover, such exposure of performance outcomes reveals variations
among providers, thereby enhancing provider competition.26 A provider's
performance record that reports safety, cost, and overall quality may
empower individuals to choose health plans or hospitals based on their
19. Furrow, supranote 15, at811.
20. See id. at 812.
21. Id. at 816.
22. Id. at 817.
23. Id. at 821-22.
24. Id. at 823.
25. William M. Sage et al., Bridging the Relational-Regulatory Gap: A Pragmatic
Information Policyfor Patient Safety and Medical Malpractice, 59 VAND. L. REv. 1263,
1274 (2006).
26. Furrow, supra note 1, at 204.
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performance. 27 Patients are currently limited in their ability to access
reliable and specific performance results of providers.28 Instead, they must
rely almost solely on provider reputation. 29 Essentially, public disclosure of
performance will force providers30 to compete on a results basis like they
presently compete via reputation.
Further, public disclosure of provider success rates, like the Joint
Commission's public reporting of data via their website, may lead to
increased demands for provider performance information. 3 Ideally, this
enhanced competition among providers enables patients to select higher
performing providers and disregard poor performers, resulting in better
performance generated across providers.32 Thus, transparency of provider
performance will allow consumers to "vote with their feet" 33 and empower
patients in a consumer-driven healthcare marketplace.34
C. Usefulness in ProviderEducation
Data transparency also affects providers' internal practices. Hospitals
are able to screen for poor performing medical staff with the advent of
performance data analysis. 35 Hospitals use the data in order to reduce risk
and improve the organization's quality of care.36 In effect, hospitals are
able to refuse staff privileges to providers who exhibit poor performance.3 7
Alternatively, providers can use performance results as an educational tool
to implement changes in the organization.38 In one published example, a
physician, surprised by his patients' abnormally
high incidents of infection,
39
was able to drop the infection rate to zero.
D. Government Ability to Elevate Quality of CareReceived
Governments can regulate and promote specific objectives for providers
in response to the information that performance data provides. They can do
this through contractual provisions, financial incentives, and continual
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Sage et al., supra note 25, at 1274-75.
Id. at 1280.
Id.
Id. at 1274.
See id. at 1280.
Id. at 1274.
Sage et al., supra note 25, at 1274.
Mello et al., supra note 3, at 392.
Furrow, supra note 15, at 819.
Id. at 819-20.
Id. at 819.
Id. at 821.
Id.
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quality surveillance. 40 For example, the patient safety organizations (PSOs)
governed by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ)
collect voluntary reports of medical errors
and establish recommendations
4
and protocols illustrating "best practices." '
According to AHRQ, its research and reports have affected healthcare
quality in a variety of different ways.42 These include improving patient
outcomes, increasing the value of healthcare services, establishing a
foundation for evidence-based medicine, developing tools that improve the
quality of care, and further, by assisting patients to become involved in
making health decisions.43 Specifically, based on AHRQ's research,
Quality Improvement Organizations implemented projects to increase
anticoagulation therapy for Medicare beneficiaries who suffered a stroke.4 4
As a result of this project, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
estimated that this improvement prevented up to 1,300 strokes.45
E. Payors Can Link Provider Compensation to Performance
Pay-for-performance programs offer a market justification for the
comparative use of performance results. 46 A payor that is unhappy with a
provider's performance can use individual performance results to terminate
a provider's contract.4 7 Alternatively, a payor can implement an incentive
program in response to provider performance. 48 Similar to pay-forperformance programs, transparency in provider performance may
influence provider liability.49
III. TORT LAW'S RELATIONSHIP WITH PERFORMANCE DATA DISCLOSURE
The dispute between medical malpractice litigation and performance
measurement disclosure as modes to improve the quality of our nation's
healthcare industry is not likely to be quickly resolved. This country's tort

40. Mello et al., supra note 3, at 392.
41. Furrow, supra note 15, at 824.
42. Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Impact of AHRQ Research 1 (2002),
available at http://www.ahrq.gov/news/impactfact.pdf.
43. Id.at 1-4.
44. Id. at 1.
45. Id.
46. Sage et al., supra note 25, at 1277; see generally Stacy L. Cook, Will Pay for
Performance be Worth the Price to MedicalProviders? A Look at Payfor Performanceand
its Legal Implicationsfor Providers, 16 ANNALS HEALTH L. 163 (2007) (discussing pay for
performance as a means to control healthcare costs while improving quality).
47. Sage et al., supra note 25, at 1281.
48. Cook, supra note 46, at 167.
49. Id. at 177.
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system assumes that retribution through monetary judgments is the best
approach to deterrence of poor performance. 50 In contrast, states and
organizations like the Joint Commission, which seek to enhance providers'
quality of care, rely on provider commitment and a sanction-free
environment to encourage improved performance. 1
A. Tort Law is Not a Sufficient Mechanism to Regulate Providers
The effectiveness of tort law in protecting and promoting patient safety
and healthcare quality is inadequate.52 First, judges lack the specific
education and experience necessary to make determinations about
healthcare quality. 3 They must instead rely on parties bringing the lawsuit
to provide evidence regarding appropriate standards of care.54 Conversely,
government agencies and accreditors typically possess vast healthcare
experience and can investigate their own facts.5 5 Second, courts cannot be
proactive in their regulation of providers, as they must wait for alreadywronged litigants to file suit.5 6 Additionally, courts are restricted in the
remedies they may provide.57 Compare this to agencies, which can conduct
increased on-site inspections, implement new58rules for all providers, require
sanctions, and revoke provider accreditation.
Further, no significant evidence supports the assumption that providers
see tort law litigation as a deterrent.5 9 Rather, providers view malpractice
suits as random and often unwarranted.60 One researcher found support in
this view: "Contributing to the perception of haphazardness are findings
from the California, New York, and Utah/Colorado studies showing that
most patients who are injured due to negligence never bring claims,

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Mello et al., supra note 3, at 391.
Id. at 391-92.
See id. at 389.
Id. at 387.
Id.
Id.
Mello et al., supra note 3, at 387.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 388.
Id. at 388.
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whereas a large proportion
of malpractice claims do not actually involve a
61
negligent injury.
Also, providers carry professional liability insurance, which further
weakens tort litigation's effect as a deterrent. So, while some providers are
forced to pay high premiums, most are still protected from the possibly
devastating economic consequences of an adverse verdict. 62 Thus, while
malpractice litigation is a concern of providers, its effectiveness as a
deterrent and ability to improve quality is arguable.
B. PerformanceData TransparencyMay Decrease Reliance on the Tort
System
Proponents of performance data disclosure believe if patients and
families have open communication with healthcare providers, they will be
less inclined to litigate.63 Providers that exhibit honesty and apologize for
mistakes are less likely to be sued by the harmed patient.64 Researchers
emphasize that the main way to improve quality is to recognize that
systems, not individual providers, are responsible for the majority of
medical errors.65 It follows that attributing errors and poor performance to
individuals through public disclosure is likely not enough to prevent
66
recurrences.
The Joint Commission, and agencies like it, wish to foster an atmosphere
of greater transparency in error reporting and provider performance.67
Currently, the Joint Commission has a voluntary sentinel event database for
providers.68 After a report is made, the facility must conduct a root cause
analysis of the incident. 69 Further, if the Joint Commission discovers such
an event was not reported, it can conduct an on-site visit at the provider's
cost or potentially rescind accreditation. 70 This is one of the reasons
providers may prefer to report to state agencies versus private accreditors.
Similar to the Joint Commission, many states believe increased
performance disclosure will enhance healthcare quality. 71 Moreover, these
states have passed laws that make patient safety data contained in reporting
61.

Id.

62.
63.
64.
65.

Mello et al., supra note 3, at 388.
Sage et al., supra note 25, at 1273.
Furrow, supra note 1, at 205.
Sage et al., supra note 25, at 1277.

66.

Id.

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Furrow, supra note 1, at 215.
Mello et al., supra note 3, at 382.
Furrow, supra note 1, at 208.
Harrington, supra note 2, at 365.
Sage et al., supra note 25, at 1278.
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systems confidential, further acting to protect such disclosed information
from discovery in litigation.72 In addition, those states that grant public
access to information primarily provide only aggregate data that is deidentified (the Joint Commission also de-identifies data).7 3 The belief is
that by creating a confidential database, more providers are likely to report
and less likely to hide poor performances. 74 Experts believe the origin of
under-reporting is directly linked to providers' fear of admissibility in
litigation or disciplinary actions by their employer. 75 Thereby, agencies, not
litigation, are able to develop more specific and appropriate
recommendations for improving the quality of care provided.7 6
Nevertheless, there is still much debate over the appropriateness of
maintaining the confidentiality of healthcare performance. The American
Association for Justice (AAJ, formerly American Trial Lawyers
Association) desires provider performance information to be available to
the public and thus not subjected to confidentiality laws.77 The conflict
between the AAJ's retributive position and confidential reporting databases
that promote disclosure is that they likely work against one another as ways
to enhance quality of care.78 Moreover, evidence concerning the impact of
performance databases on providers and the tort system is only beginning to
emerge.7 9
IV. CONCLUSION

Governments, providers, payors, and private accreditors all seek and
potentially benefit from the collection and analysis of performance data.
Likewise, such transparency of performance allows individual consumers to
make informed decisions. In the following transcript, Dr. Schyve addresses
performance measurement in improvement and accreditation. He focuses
specifically on the role of performance measurement in hospitals, including
accreditation requirements, public reporting, and the ability to compare
performance measures across providers.

72. Mello et al., supra note 3, at 385.
73. Harrington, supra note 2, at 355.
74. Id. at351-52.
75. Id. at 332, 360.
76. See Mello et al., supra note 3, at 387.
77. See American Association for Justice, http://www.atla.org/pressroom/FACTS/
secrecy/index.aspx (last visited Jan. 17, 2007).
78. See Mello et al., supra note 3, at 391.
79. Id. at 389.
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